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 clA.L., GAUTREAUX 
~~ ~ 
Preliminary Memo 
Cert. to CA 7 







~~~ l. Petr seeks review of CA 7's decision that th~ district - t ( \' ~/>r.Jo~~
1
~~- (E.D. Ill. Austin) should adopt a metropolitan-wide plan 
~yv- • I I \ • 
~\rt:,;or desegregation ~ £ the public housing system operated by the 
l>'I-J...~~y of Chicago. The CA decision was premised on prior findings 
• ~1'.1-that the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and HUD had engaged in 
~~ .A.. 1 unconstitutional site s e lection and tenant assignment procedures, 





thereby creating a segregated system. The SG contends that the 
order is inconsistent with Milliken v. Bradley. 
2. FACTS: In 1966 separate actions, subsequently consolidated, 
were brought against CHA and HUD, alleging the operation of a 
segregated public housing system. Judgments on liability were 
obtained in 1969, against CHA, and in 1971, against HUD • ..!/ Subsequent 
litigation has dea~t with the problem of remedy, and apparently has 
been characterized by considerable stalling and non-cooperation on 
the part of CHA (no public housing has been built . in Chicago Pince 
1969) • I gather that CHA is subject to an injunction requiring~ 
• number of units to be built in predominantly white areas (one-
third of which could be in areas outside the city of Chicago, 
pursuant to CHA's statutory authority to contract with the Cook 
County Housing Authority), and to choose a specified number of 
sites by a date certain • 
• 
With regard to .an appropriate remedy against ·HUD, respondents 
sought to have CHA and HUD directed to use their best efforts to 
provide public housing units in the surrounding suburban counties. 
The request relied heavily on CA 6 1 s Bradley v. Milliken decision, 
.!/Summary judgment against HUD was entered upon direction of CA 7, 
after the district court had dismissed the action against it; CA 7's 
I 
decision was based on HUD' s "knowjp!;'{ acquiescence" in CHA' s p ractice~, 
although it acknowledged that HUD had made consistent efforts to a ' E 
CHA's site-selection practices, and that HUD was faced with the 
dilemma of either funding segregated housing or none at all. The 





which at that time had not been reversed by this Court. The 
district court denied such relief, however, concluding that it 
went "far beyond the issues of this case." While the court 
made a confusing observation that, "unlike education, the right 
to adequate housing is not constitutionally guaranteed and is a 
✓ matter for the legislature," it recognized that programs which 




here the wrongs had been committed solely within Chicago. Moreove_r, 
\-
"it has never been alleged that CHA and HUD discriminated or 
fostered racial discrimination in the suburbs and, given the 
limits of CHA's jurisdiction, such claims could never be proved 
against the principal offender herein." The court plainly was 
unwilling to further complicate and delay such relief as had . 
, I 
already been ordered by attempting a metropolitan plan for "relief 
against political entities which have previously had nothing to 
' )1~+- \ do with this lawsuit." It therefore entered an order that HUD 
c+--
~e;~ use its best efforts to cooperate with CHA in efforts to increase 
f/.fbr h . h 1 f b 1 · h . . f . . h . . 
l , -L- t e supp y o pu ic ous ing in con ormity wit its previous W\-j &A.~.c.:n" ... 
injunction against CHA. 
CA 7 rendered its decision after Milliken was decided in this 
~ 
• 
..._____w _______________ _ 
Court. It distinguished the case on the theory that Milliken --dealt not with substantive constitutional law, but rather with 
principles of equitable reliefo CA 7 focused on Milliken's 
discussion of the administrative difficulties with effectively 
7 
. . - -
- -4-
-
consolidating a metropolitan area's school systems, and of the 
"deeply-rooted" traditions of local control of schools. Thus 
Milliken was viewed as part of the line of precedent, extending 
back to Brown I, which recognized that remedial complexities 
'e 
-
could affect the implementation of substantive rights. 
The court then concluded that in the public housing area 
the equitable considerations were not such as to preclude area-
wide remedies. There was no deeply-rooted tradition of local 
control of public housing; rather, the federal government had 
been heavily involved from the beginning. Practical problems 
were thought to be insignificant compared to school consolidation, 
since "CHA and HUD can build housing much like any other landowner." 
Moreover, there was some evidence of suburban discrimination_ in 
the ' fact that of 12 suburban public housing projects, 10 were 
located in or adjacent to black areas. Finally, metropolitan 
relief had long been considered, and was recognized by all parties 
as the only effective remedy to the problem of meeting the housing 
needs of the urban poor, and of doing so in a manner which could 
be considered desegregated; especially was this true in light of 
"white flight" to the suburbs. On this basis, CA 7 remanded for 
the district court to consider and fa shion a met r op olitan public 
· 0 ~ plan. llPYSJ 
Judge Tone dissented, on the grounds that Milliken required 






found. While he agreed that a metropolitan plan was needed to 
reduce overall segregation, he concluded that the absence of 
j suburban violations precluded such relief here. 
A petition for rehearing was denied, over a short opinion 
apparently premised on the proposition that Milliken was 
court 
applicable. The/opined that there was a showing of "significant 
segregative effect." in suburban jurisdictions caused by consti-
~1tutional violations in Chicago, and that interdistrict remedies 
l were thus appropriate under Milliken. It found this effect in 
the possibility that CHA's discriminatory practices had fostered 
the racial paranoia which created white flight, and which was 
making it increasingly difficult to produce an integrated housing 
system within Chicago proper. Judge Tone adhered to his earlier 
dissent. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG reads Milliken as a substantive 
principle of constitutional law precluding relief that extends 
beyond the parameters of the constitutional violation which is 
pleaded and proved. Here, the evidence that suburban housing 
projects are located in black communities is insufficient to 
prove suburban violations, for 3 are in white census tracts, 
5 are in municipalities lacking white census tracts, 2 were 
completed in 1953 and the racial balance at that time is not 
in the record, 1 is in a tract which became black after completion 






at the time of completion. Moreover, assuming that an inter-
district effect is sufficient to warrant an interdistrict 
remedy, no such effect has been shown; CA 7's reliance on the 
possibility that CHA's policies have produced racial paranoia, 
and t herefore segregated suburbs, is pure s geculation. :..:: = 
Even if Millik e n is nothing more than an equitable limitation 
on the remedies which may be invoked to cure constitutional 
violations, the situation here qualifies. While HUD provides the 
bulk of financing, the initiative for public housing rests with 
local authorities, and it is the local authorities which must 
a gree to provide the necessary schools, -sewers, waterlines, streets, 
transportation and similar services. Implementation of an inter-
district remedy would likewise involve complex administrative 
problems, requiring the participation of the 100 or so political 
units in the Chicago suburban area. The interdistrict remedy 
would thus be far more administratively difficult than a Chicago-
only remedy, and the latter itself has proven very difficult to 
implement. 
Resps contend that as to HUD, the remedy is not an iriter-
district remedy , since HUD has for years viewed the problem in 
area-wide terms, and for administrative and planning purposes 
considers the city's boundaries to be thoroughly artificial. 
Moreover, there is evidence of suburban discrimination, in that 





populated by black tenants. Nor are the practical problems which 
were present in Milliken of serious concern here. HUD can do a 
great deal without local cooperation, at least under several new 
programs which permit direct contracting for construction or 
rehabilitation of low-income housing. 42 u.s.c. § 1437f(b). 
And no massive restructuring of state laws would be required 
merely setting aside the requirement of local approval of CHA's 
suburban project plans would be sufficient. 
Resps also contend that review would be premature, becau?e 
the judgment is not final, the relief which will be ordered is 
' not known, and this Court does not have the history of dealing 
with litigation of this sort which would enable it to reach an 
• 
informed decision without a complete record. Perhaps in 
anticipation of this argument, the SG contends that prompt 
resolution is required because the uncertainty that has been 
created discourages suburban jurisdictions from pa.rticipating 
at all in public housing programs -- fearing that the housing 
will be used for persons on CHA's waiting lists, they see no 
point in producing the housing which their own residents admitt e dly 
need. Resps' counter with the arguments that§ 1437f(b) programs 
do not require local participation, that the 1974 Amendments 
plainly encourage dispersal of low-income housing into suburban 
areas, and that political jurisdictions are supposed to conside r 








those who may be "expected to reside" in the community. 42 u.s.c. 
§ 5304 (a) (4) (A). 
4. DISCUSSION: In order to avoid the impact of Milliken, CA 7 
has not only interpreted it quite narrowly, but has also engaged 
I{ \ \ 
in considerable speculation as to the presence of suburban violations 
an~ as to the suburb.!,:1 effe::_ of CHA's pr_:gtices. I read the 
decision as being basically bottomed on the judgment that because 
of white flight, a remedy within Chicago is inadequate to create 
the racial balances necessary to free "our minorities [from] the 
jobless slums of the ghettoes." A suburban remedy was thus thought 
necessary , and was obtained by fashioning such distinctions of 
Milliken as were required. 
\
I I would 
~ xactly what 
have no doubt that review was in order if I knew 
is encompassed in CA 7's judgment. If the court's 
concept of a metropolitan remedy is nothing more than one in 
which CHA and HUD are required to use their best e ·fforts and 
existing powers to build such suburban housing as they can, 
then the remedy is by no means extragavant; I doubt however that 
much would be accomplished, given that the suburban jurisdictions 
retain control of such matters as zoning, building permits, water 
------------- -and sewage hook-ups, streets, etc. On the other hand, if CA 7 
~ -- "'-' 
is understood to mandate suburban construction over the protests 
of the suburban jurisdictions, then there is a strong possibility 








contemplated, since it gave no indication that the remedy should 
be limited to such measures as elicited suburban cooperation; 
moreover, while resps contend that HUD can do much on its own 
initiative, they also suggest that it might be appropriate to 
eliminate the state statutory requirement that CHA obtain local 
approval of its suburban projects. In this regard, several 
suburban housing authorities have been joined in this suit on 
remand to the district court. 
For obvious reasons, CHA is not a party to th·e petition • . 
There is a response. 
3/31/75 Jacobs Opns in pet. appx . 
.. 
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CRS/gg 1-, 76 -
BOBTAIL :MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Carl R. Schenker DATE: January 19, 1976 
No. 74-1047 Hills v. Gautreaux 
Basieall½ I would affinn. 
modify the CA's order. 
But I would significantly 
In Milliken, the interdistrict nature of the relief 
had two significances. (A) Relief was ordered there against 
presumably innocent government entities that had had no 
opportunity to participate in the proceedings. (B) The 
sweeping away of local government lines poses significant 
practical questions. I believe that Milliken turned primarily /vb 
on factor (A). , The basic thrust of the opinion is that 
government boundary lines can be swept away in the face of 
constitutional violations, but that should not be done casually. 
Rather, it should be done only when the governments sought to be 
affected by the remedial decree are guilty of constitutional 
violations. Because factor (A) precluded relief, factor (B) 
was not really pursued in the case . 
Thus, I think the SG is correct in urging that Milliken 
is not limited to the special practical difficulties that might 






Rather, I read Milliken as announcing a general rule of 
equitable relief dealing with interdistrict situations 
(stemming from factor A). Primary focus on factor (A) 
in interdistrict cases is justified. The practical 
2. 
difficulties in according relief in such situations would 
vary with the particular government function in question, but 
~ '"~trt"V-1'-+ c.a~ 
there are theoretical constants arguing against r elLeLi unless 
the Milliken requirements are met. In particular, there is 
the notion that local government boundaries do have a functional 
and historical legitimacy that cannot be disregarded. Consequently, 
if this case involved an order that the Chicago suburbs or 
their housing authorities take remedial action, I would 
recommend reversal because of factor (A). I am not persuaded 
by the arguments advanced in Parts II and III of respondents 
brief to the effect that if Milliken applies, there should still 
be area-wide relief. 
But this is not an interdistrict case, as respondents 
argue persuasively in Part I of their brief. HUD is the only 
~. * party which has sought cert from the order below. I therefore 
think that the argument of the respondents in Part I controls 
the case: (1) HUD has been found to have pe,trated an 
independent constitutional violation, (2) by HUD's own 
definition the relevant "district" for its operations is the 
a.( 4.a.. 
entire Chicago lhousing market, and (3) extra-Chicago relief 
can practicably be ordered against HUD. Components (1),(2), 







and (3) combine6)significant1R distinguish this case from 
Milliken. 
Component (1) of the respondents' argument completely 
distinguishes this case from factor (A) of Milliken. Here 
HUD's constitutional violations and obligations are the only 
ones at stake. HUD is a unitary operation, and it has been 
found guilty of a constitutional violation. Thus, if HUD is ~ 
ordered to take area-wide remedial steps, the concerns involved ~/-44, 
in factor (A) of Milliken do not arise. No innocent 
Government body is being ordered to give relief, and there 
are no "due process" related problems from failure to hear the ~-
cases of other government entities involved. l;:;!;:;4f 
From the foregoing I conclude that area wide-relief -~ 
~ 
against HUD is permissible despite Milliken. 
-:-------
Here I part 
company with the Court of Appeals, however, for the Court of ~ ~ 
Appeals appears to have taken the further step of ruling tha~ 
area-wide relief was required. I think in doing that the CA 
ignored factor (B). Although factor (B) did not influence 
the outcome of Milliken, it is important and deserves greater 
weight than CA 7 recognized. 
Factor (B) is the simple reality that in drawing 
equitable decrees a court must take account of practicalities. 
--------------Particular difficulties in equitable relief were perceived 
to exist in the interdistrict school situation (although factor 







particular difficulties associated with interdistrict relief 
do not exist here because HUD is a unitary entity. But 
since HUD must operate across local government lines, some 
difficulties might arise that are related to those in an 
interdistrict case. These should be given more consideration 
than CA 7 seemed to give them. 
That is not to say that any such difficulties preclude 
area-wide relief here against HUD. In fact, I think that 
respondents show persuasively that the difficulties here 
are rather slight in components (2) and (3) of their 
argument. 
In component (2) they point out that HUD itself defines 
the relevant area in its function not as the "district" of 
Chicago but as the area-wide housing market. Thus, as a matter 
of practicalities HUD is willing to operate across "district" 
lines. In component (3) they also point out persuasively 
that HUD is able to operate across "district" lines. First, 
since 1974 HUD has significant capabilities to operate 
independently of local housing authorities by contracting directly 
with private parties. Second, even in dealing with local 
housing authorities, practicable relief could be ordered against 
HUD. For example, HUD could be ordered to prefer housing 
applications from suburban housing authorities and to make 






Thus, factor (B) does not preclude area-wide 
relief against HUD. But, as with all equitable relief, 
practicalities should be taken into account. Here all of 
5. 
the relevant practicalities may not have been aired. I there-
fore would modify the CA opinion to the extent that it 
appears to order area-wide relief. The District Court should - ~------------
be directed instead to include area-wide relief within the : 
range of remedies that it may impose. 
I don't think there is any satisfactory answer to the 
foregoing analysis, and I urge you to adopt it. But I do see 
a means by which the Court could decide that area-wide relief 
is precluded. Milliken put stress on the fact that equitable 
decrees are to remedy the unconstitutional condi t i on. The 
only unconstitutional condition that has been shown here is 
discrimination in Chicago housing. I don't think that HUD 
would have violated the constitution by following non-
discriminatory practices in Chicago itself even if there were 
no housing projects located in the suburbs. Thus, it can be 
argued that the relief should be limited to Chicago, absent 
proof of (1) discriminatory practices by HUD in the suburbs or 
(2) an e ffect in the suburbs from the Chicago practices. 
(Neither of which has been proved.) 






case, where discrimination in one part of a school district 
was presumed to have effects in other parts. HUD itself 
defines the relevant housing "district" for its purposes 
6. 
as the area-wide market, so it must be pre sumed that the 
discriminatory practices by HUD in one part of the market have 
impacts throughout it. But Keyes was a one-district situation. 
Although HUD is also a single entity, if one combines the 
reasoning in the previous paragraph with Milliken's focus 
C.Q.I\ bt. 
on boundaries, Keyes~istinguished. That is, it could be 
argued that since HUD would not have violated the Constitution 
as long as it followed nondiscriminatory practices within 
Chicago, it cannot be ordered to remedy the discrimination 
on an area-wide basis. 
I find this distinction hollow in the context 
of a discrimination by HUD. When HUD as a single entity 
creates discriminatory dislocations in any part of its own system, 
a District Court should be able to enter an area-wide decree 
if it finds such a decree necessary. Milliken's focus on I 
boundaries makes sense only where they have functional 
and historical significance. Local governmental boundaries don't 
have that significance for HUD's operations. 
Carl 
• -
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Re: Hills V. Gautreaux, No. 74-1047 
L'- , '-' , ... ' .. / • . , ~ 
The pertinent information about HUD's use of XK the 
housing-market concept is set out in Respondents Brief at 
19-26, especially the first few pages. As you can see, it's 
reliance on this concept is codified in C.F.R. 
~ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 74-1047 
Carla A. Hills, Secretary of 
Housing and Urban De-
velopment, Petitioner, 
v. 
Dorothy Gautreaux et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit. 
[March -, 1976] 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opm1on of the 
Court. 
The United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) has been judicially found to have 
violated the Fifth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 in connection with the selection of sites for pub-
lic housing in the city of Chicago. The issue before us 
is whether the remedial order of the federal trial court 
may extend beyond Chicago's territorial boundaries. 
I 
This extended litigation began in 1966 when the re-
spondents, six Negro tenants in or applicants for public 
housing in Chicago, brought separate actions on behalf 
of themselves and all other Negro tenants and applicants 
similarly situated against the Chicago Housing Authority 
(CHA) and HUD.1 The complaint filed against CHA in 
the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
1 The original complaint named the Housing Assistance Admin-
i.,tration, t hen a. corporate agency of HUD, as the defendant. Al-
though the petitioner in this caaSe is the current Secretary of HUD, 
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tnct ot lllmo1s alleged that betwee11 1950 and 1966 sub-
stantially all of the sites for family public housing se-
lected by CHA and approved by the Chicago City 
Council were "at the time of select10n, and are now,'' 
located ",Yithm the areas kno,Yn as the Negro Ghetto.' ' 
The respondents further alleged that CHA deliberately 
selected the sites to "avoid the placement of Negro fam-
ilies in white neighborhoods" in violation of federal stat-
utes and the Fourteenth Amendment. ln a companion 
smt against HUD the respondents claimed that it had 
"assisted m the carrymg on and continues to assist in 
the carrymg on of a racially discriminatory public hous-
mg system within the City of Chicago" by providing 
financial assistance and other support for CHA's dis-
cnmmatory housing pro,1ects.0• 
The District Court stayed the act10n agamst HUD 
pending resolut10n of the CHA suit.J In February of 
1969, the court entered summary judgment against CHA 
on the ground that it had violated the respondents' con-
stitut10nal rights by selecting public housmg sites and 
assigning tenants on the basis of race .4 Gautreaux Y. 
• The complaint sou~ln to enJoin Hl'D from providmg funds for 
17 proJects th:it had been proposed by CHA m 1965 and 1966 and 
trom makmg aYailable to CHA an~· other financial assistance to be 
used lll connect10n with the racia ll~· d1scnmmator)· aspects of the 
Chicago public housmg system. In addit10n, the respondents rE>-
quested that they be granted "such other and further relief as the 
Court ma~· deem just and equitable.· 
3 Before the sta>· of the action against HUD, the District Court 
had certified the plaintiff class in the CHA action and had rejected 
CHA's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the counts 
of the complaint alleging that CHA had intentionally selected public 
housing sites to nvmd desegregat mg- housmg pattern!' 265 F Supp 
582 
• CHA admitted that it had followed a pohcy of mformally clear-
ing proposed family public housmg sn es \\'1 th the alderman m whose 
ward the propo~ed Slfl! 1va,- lQcated and of P,hmmatmg each site.· 
- -
't4-Jn4i ~-oPr:~·J () ,\-
HILLS 1· GAUTREA U ~ '-' 
CH A . 296 F . Supp. 907. Uncontrad1cted evidence sub~ 
mitted to the District Court established that the public 
housrng system operated by CHA was racially segregated, 
with 9911:! o/c of the family units located in ?\ egro neigh-
borhoods and 99 % of those units occupied by Negro 
tenants. Id. , at 910. 5 In order to prohibit future viola-
tions and to remedy the effects of past unconstitutional 
practices. the court directed CHA to build its next 700 
family units in predominantly white areas of Chicago 
and thereafter to locate at least 75% of its new family 
public housi'ng in predominantly white areas insid~ Chi-
cago or in Cook County. Gautreaux v. CHA, 304 F . 
Supp. 736, 738-739.6 In addition, CHA was ordered to· 
opposed bY the alderman. 296 F. Supp. 907, 910. 913. This pro-
cedure had resulted in the rejection of 99½% of the units proposed 
for sites in white areas which had been initially selected as suitable 
for public housing by CHA. Id., at 912. 
With regard to tenant ass1~mnents , the court found that CHA 
had established a racial quota to restrict the number of Negro 
families residing in the four CHA family public housing projects 
located in white areas in Chicago. The projects. all built prior to 
1944. had Negro tenant populations of 7% , 6%, 4%. and 1% despite · 
the fa ct that :;.; egroes comprised about 90% of the tenants of CHA 
family housmg units and a similar percentage of the waiting list. 
A CHA officia l testified that from 1950 through 1968 the four proj-
ects located in white area~ were listed on the authority 's tenant 
selection form as smtable for white families only. Id. , at 909. 
5 ln July of 1968, CHA had in operation or development 54 family 
housmg projects with a total of 30,848 units. Statistics submitted 
to the Dist rict Court established that, aside from the four over-
whelmingly whne projects discussed in n. 4, supra, 92% of all of'· 
CHA's housing umts were located in neighborhoods that were at 
least 75% l\'egro and that two-thirds of the units were situated in 
areas with more than 95% Xegro residents . 296 F . Supp., at 910. 
6 The District Court 's remedial decree divided Cook County into 
a '·General Public Housing Area" and a "Limited Public Housing-· 
Area.'' The ''Limited Public Housing Area" consisted or the ar ea 
within census tracts havmg a 30% or more non-white population 
o.r. wJthin one .mile a,( thP, houndar1 of any such census tract. The: 
- -
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modify its tenant assignment and site selection proce-
dures and to use its best efforts to increase the supply of 
dwelling umts as rapidly as possible in conformity with 
the judgment. Id. , at 739-741. 
The District Court then turned to the action against 
HUD. In September of 1970, it granted HUD's motion 
to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and fail-
ure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit reversed and ordered the District Court to enter-
summary judgment for the respondents, holding that 
HUD had violated both the Fifth Amendment and § 601 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U. S. C. § 2000d 
( 1970) , by knowingly sanctioning and assisting CHA's 
racially discriminatory public housing program. 448 F. 
2d 731. 739-740.7 
On remand, the trial court addressed the difficult prob-
lem of providing an effective remedy for the racially 
segregated public housing system that had been created· 
remainder of Cook County was included in the "General Public 
Housing Area." Following the commencement of construction of 
at least 700 farnil~· units in the General Public Housing Area of 
the City of Chicago , CHA was permitted by the terms of the order 
to locate up to one-third of its General Public Housing Area units 
in portions of Cook County outs1di> of Chicago. See 304 F . Supp., 
at 738-739 
7 The Court of Appeals found that "HUD retained a large amount 
of d1scret1on to approve or reiect both site selection and tenant 
assignment procedures of the local housing authority" and that 
the Secretary had exercised those powers "in a manner which per-· 
petuated a racially discriminatory housmg system in Chicago." 448 
F. 2d, at 739. Although the appellate court stated that it was · 
"fully sympathetic" with the '· very real •dilemma.''' presented by 
the need for public hou~ing in Chicago, 1t ruled that the demand' 
for housing did not Justify " the Secretary 's past actions [ which] 
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by the unconstitutional conduct of CHA and HUD.8 
The court granted the respondents' motion to consoli-
date the CHA and HUD cases and ordered the parties 
to formulate "a comprehensive plan to remedy the past 
The courts July 1969 order directing CHA to use its best efforts 
to increase public housing opportumties in white areas as rapidly as 
possible had not re.suited in the submission of a single housing site 
to the Chicago City Council. A subsequent order directing the 
submission of sites for 1500 units by September 20, 1970, had 
eventually prompted CHA to submit proposed sites in the spring 
of 1971, but inaction by the City Council had held up the approval 
of the sites required for their development . See Gautreaux v. Rom-
ney, 332 F. Supp. 366 
The District Court subsequently took additional measures in an 
attempt to implement the remedial orders entered against CHA. 
In May 1971, the city of Chicago and HUD agreed to a letter of 
intent that provided that the city would process sites suitable for use 
by CHA to permit the authority to commence acquisition of sites 
for 1,700 units in accordance with a specified timetable. HUD then 
released certain Model Cities funds on the condition that the City 
Council and CHA continue to show progress toward meeting the 
goals set forth m the May Jetter. After the city fell far behind 
schedule. the District Court granted the respondents ' request for 
an m.1unct1on d1rectmg HUD to withhold S26 million in Model Cities 
funds until the city remedied ,ts ex,stmg deficit under the timetable. 
'See 332 F . Supp. 366. The Court of Appeals reversed the injunc-
tion, holdmg that the District Court had abused its discret10n in 
ordermg funding cutoff. Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F . 2d 124 . 
Between July 1971 and April 1972, the City Council failed to 
conduct any hearings with respect to acquisition of property for 
.housing sites and did not approve land acquisitio~ for any sites. 
Followmg the filing of a supplemental complaint naming the mayor 
and the members of the City Council as defendants, the District 
Court found that their inaction had prevented CHA from provid-
ing relief in conformity with the court 's prior orders. In a further 
effort to effectuate relief, the court ruled that the provision of Illi-
nois law requmng City Council approval of land acquisition by 
CHA '·shall nor be applicable to CHA's act10ns .. . taken for the 
purpose of prov1dmg Dwellmg Umts." 342 F . Supp. 827, 830. The 
Court of Appeals upheld this dec1s10n . 480 F . 2d 210 
- -
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effects of uuconstitut10nal site select10n procedures.i' 
The order directed the parties to ''provide the Court 
with as broad a range of alternatives as seem ... fea~ 
sible .. mcluding ·'alternatives ·which are not confined in 
theH scope to the geographic boundary of the City of 
Chicago.~ After considerat10n of the plans submitted 
by the parties and the evidence adduced in their sup-
port. the court denied the respondents ' motion to con-
sider metropolitan relief and adopted the petitioner's 
proposed order requiring HUD to use its best efforts to 
assist CHA in increasmg the supply of dwelling units 
and enjoinmg HUD from funding family public housing 
programs in Chicago that were inconsistent with the 
previous judgment entered agamst CHA. The court. 
found that, metropolitan relief was unwarranted because 
"the wrongs were committed within the limits of Chicago 
and solely against residents of the City" and there were 
no allegations that "CHA and HUD discriminated or 
fostered racial discrimination in the suburbs " 
On appeal , the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circmt, with one Judge dissentrng. reversed and remanded 
the case for "the adoption of a comprehensive metro-
politan area plan that will not only disestablish the seg-
regated public housmg system m the City of Chicago ... 
but will increase the supply of dwelling units as rapidly 
as possible." 503 F . 2d 930, 939. Shortly before the 
Court of Appeals announced its decision, this Court in 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U . S. 717, had reversed a j udg-
ment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that 
had approved a plan requiring the consolidation 
of 54 school districts 11 1 the Detroit metropolitan 
area to remedy racial discrimination ill the opera-
tion of the Detroit public schools. Understand~ 
.1ng Milliken "to hold that t.he relief sought. 
there woul<l bi> an impractical ancl 1Jnreasonab]e over-
- -
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response 1,0 a violat10n limited to one school district," 
the Court of Appeals concluded that the Milliken de-
cision did not bar a remedy extending beyond the limits 
of Chicago m the present case because of the equitable 
and admimstrative distinct10ns between a metropolitan 
public housing plan and the consolidation of numerous 
local school districts. 503 F . 2d. at 935-936. In addi-
tion , the appellate court found that. in contrast to Milli-
ken, there ·was evidence of suburban discrimination and 
of the likelihood that there had been an "extra-city 
impact'' of the petitioner's "intra-city discrimination ." 
Id., at 936-937, 939-940. The appellate court's deter-
minat10n that a remedy extendrng beyond the city limits 
was both "necessary and equitable" rested in part on 
the agreement of the parties and the expert witnesses 
that "the metropolitan area is a single relevant locality 
for low rent housing purposes and that a city-only 
remedy will not work." Id., at 936, 937. HUD sub-
sequently sought review in this Court of the permissi-
bility in light of Milliken of "mter-district relief for 
discrimination in public housing in the absence of a find-
ing of an rnter-distnct violation.' ' ti ,v e granted certio-
rari t-0 consider th is important quest10n . 421 U, S. 962. 
:a 
In Milliken v. Bradley , supra, this Court considered 
the proper scope of a federal court's equity decree in the 
context of a school desegregation case. The respondents 
in that case had brought an action alleging that the 
Detroit Public School System was segregated on the 
basis of race as the result of official conduct and sought 
an order establishing "a unitary, nonracial school sys-
tem.·· 418 F. S., at 722-723. After finding that con-
9 Although CHA panicipated in the proceedmg before the Court 
of Appeals. It did not seek review of that court's decision and has 
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stitut1011al violat10ns committed by the Detroit School 
Board and state officials had contributed to racial segre-
gation in the D etroit schools, the trial court had pro-
ceeded to the formul ation of a remedy , Although there 
had been neither proof of unconstitutional actions on 
the part of neighboring school districts nor a demonstra-
tion that the Detroit violations had produced significant 
segregative effects in those districts , the court established 
a desegregation panel and ordered 1t to prepare a reme-
dial plan consolidating the Detroit school system and 53 
independent suburban school districts. Id. , at 733-734.1 0 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed 
the desegregat10n order on the ground that. in view of 
t he ra cial composition of th e D etroit school system, the 
only frn::iblP rf'mPd~· rf'quirrd ' ·the crossmg of the bound-
:-,ry !11" -- lH 1wcc•n tIH' n,,tror School Distri ct and ad-
J!H'<·lll or :1t' .. rli~· !--Ci:Po: d1:-tn ·t,.' B .-adlc11 , . J fillikcn . 
.; ,.; F. :.?d ~ 1 :,. '.:·1 ·•. Tn1.-;; l<•· 1:-• r"~ rr:-{ d t!lC' C'ou rt of 
.. ~pp-.•~l,. liu1,LJt~ l:i:it th(' n,u;l!th'.'--t! JC·t f"t'lnf...fy conlt·In-
pLt I l,y ti l d ,- !::;f•.·::::1'.( l! 1ll'ti1-r \\:!:- :l!l ('ffUllt'(ltl~ (':\.1'1"-
Cl S(' of t he C'qm table :nnhont~· of the frdf'ral courts. 
Althou~h t hP J/ il/i!.-cn opmion discussed the many 
p ractical probk·ms that would he encountered in the con-
solidation of numerous school districts by Judicial decree, 
the Court's decision reJecting th e m etropolitan area de-
segregation order was actually based on fundamental 
10 Although the trial court 's desegreganon order in Milliken did 
not direct the adoption of a specific met ropolitan plan, it did con-
tain detailed guidelines for the panel appointed to draft the desegre-
gation plan. 345 F. Supp. 914 (ED Mich.) . The framework for 
the plan called for the division of the designated 54-school distnct 
desegregation area into 15 clusters, each containing a part of the 
Detroit school system and two or more suburban districts. Id., at: 
928--929. "'ithin this framework, the court charged the panel with '. 
t -he responsibility for devising a plan that would produce the maxi-
m11m actual des~re~atJon. Ir! at 91 8 ~ 418 U. S., at 733-73-L 
01( 
fll. 
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hm1tat1ons on the remedial po"·ers of the federal courts 
to restructure the operation of local and state govern-
mental entities. That power is not plenary. It "may 
be exercised 'only on the basis of a constitutional viola-
t10n .' ·· 418 U. S., at 738. quoting Swann v. Charlotte-
Meckl enburg Board of Education, 402 U . S. 1, 16. See 
Rizzo v. Goode, - U. S. -. - . Once a constitu-
tional violation is found. a federal court is required to 
tailor ''the scope of the remed:v'" to fit "the nature and 
extent of the violation.•· 418 U. S., at 738; Swann, 
supra, at 16. In Milliken, there "·as no finding of un-
constitutional action on the part of the suburban school 
officials and no demonstration that the violations com-
mitted in the operation of the Detroit school system had 
had any significant segregative effects in the suburbs. 
See 418 U. S., at 745, 748. The desegregation order in 
Milliken requiring the consolidation of local school dis-
tricts in the Detroit metropolitan area thus constituted -' n 
direct federal Judicial interference with ,_ '""'"t'j iif'(IJ>, .. 1 
governmental entities without the necessary p dicate 
of a constitutional violation by those entities or(!he iden- @ 
tification within them of any significant segregative ef-- -
fects resulting from the Detroit school officials' unconsti-
tutional conduct. Under these circumstances, the Court 
held that the interdistrict decree was impermissible be-
cause 1t was not commensurate with the constitutional 
v10lation to be repaired . 
Since the Milliken decision was based on basic limita-
tions on the exercise of the equity power of the federal 
courts and not on a balancing of particular considerations 
presented by school desegregation cases, it is apparent 
that the Court of Appeals erred in finding Milliken in-
aJJplicabl{to this public housing case.11 The school de-
11 The Court of Appeals interpreted the M illiken op1mon as 
l_i1:_rutecl _ to a detPrmmatiou that. m vw,,· of the admm1st rat1vi> com-
- -
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segregation context of the Milliken case is nonetheless 
important to an understanding of its discussion of the 
limitations on the exercise of federal judicial power. As 
ple:-.itiPS of o:chool d1:<irict ron~ohdanon and the deepl~·-rooted tradi-
tion of local control of publi c :;chools, the balance of equitable 
factors weighed against metropolitan school deo:egregation remedies. 
See 503 F. 2d, at. 935-936. But tbe Court 's decis10n in Milliken 
was premised on a controllmg prmc1ple govermng the permissible 
scope of federal judicial power, a principle not hlllited to a school 
desegregation context. See 418 U . S., at 744 
In addition , the Court of Appeals surmised that either an inter-
dist-rict violation or an interd1stnct segregative effect may have 
been present in this case. There 1s no support for either conclusion. 
The sole basis of the appellate court 's discussion of alleged suburban 
discrimination was the respondents ' exhibit 11 illustrating the loca,.. 
tion of 12 housing projects withm the portion of the Chicago 
Urbanized Area outside the city hlllits of Chicago. That exhibit 
showed that 11 of the 12 projects were located in areas that, at 
the tune of the hearing in November of 1972. were within one mile 
of the boundary of a census t ract, with less than a 70% white 
population . The exhibit was offered to illustrate the scarcity of 
integrated public housmg opportumt1es for the plamtiff class and 
for lower-income white families and to indicate why the respondents 
did not '·expect cooperation from the suburban areas" in providing 
housing alternatffes m predommatel~- whne a reas. ln discussing 
the data underl~·mg the exh1b1t., coun:;el for the respondents in the 
trial court expre:;sly attempted to a,·01d the " possible misconcep-
tion" that he was asserting that, the suburban municipalities and 
housing authorities were "gu.ilt.y of any discnmination or wrong-
doing." In view of the purpose for which the exhibit was offered 
and the District Court 's determination that " the wrongs were com-
mitted within the limit;; of Chicago,·· It is apparent that the Court 
of Appeals was mistaken in supposing that the exhibit constitutes 
evidence of suburban discrimmation justifying metropolitan area 
relief. 
In its brief opinion on rehearing, the Court of Appeals as.serted 
that. " it is reasonable to conclude from the record" that the intra~ 
city violation "may well haYe fostered racial pa ranoia and encour-
aged the 'wlute flight' phenomenon which has exacerbated the 
prohlem5 of achieving intPgrat10n .' r,o:~ F . 2d, at 939-940. The 
w½~ ,, 
~"CJP-~ , 
"( ·...1 ii. (..o nJ .. .s..~ 
(A -lftt ~~alt (-.c. ,.f e 
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the Court noted. school d1stnct lines cannot be "casually 
jgnored or treated as a mere administrative convenience" 
because they separate mdependent governmental entities 
responsible for the operation of autonomous public school 
systems. 418 U. S .. at i41-743. The Court's holding 
that there had to be an interdistrict violation or effect 
before a federal court could order the crossing of district 
boundary lines reflected the substantive impact of a con-
solidation remedy on i:l ,c l!ltth 2 o 1. of separate and 
independent school districts.12 The District Court's de-
segregation order in .Milliken was held to be an imper-
missible remedy not because it envisioned relief ag.ainst 
a wrongdoer extending beyond the city in which the vio-
lation occurred but because it contemplated a om · t •· 
judicial decree restructuring the operation of local gov-
ernmental entities that ,rnre not implicated in any con-
stitutional violation. 
III 
The question presented in this case concerns only the· 
authority of the District Court to order HUD to take 
remedial action outside the city limits of Chicago. HUD 
does not dispute the Court of Appeals' determination 
Court of Appeals' speculation about the effects of the discriminatory 
site selection in Chicago urt 1 \ is cont rary both t.- Ii@! ' snd w 
'xpert testimony m the record !l: · 1 ho tails far short oi t 
demonstration of a "significant segregati~ effect in another district"· 
discussed in the Milliken opinion. See 418 U. S., at 745. 
12 The Court in Milliken required either a showing of an inter-
rlistrict violation or a significant segregative effect "[b]efore the 
boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set 
aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial pur ses ,, . 
418 U. S., at 744-745An Its amicus net m i ·en, e United 
'5Ulre:, emphasized tha.t an interdistrict remedy in that case would 
rt ·q111r0 ·' the restructuring of sta te or local governmental entities" 
;irnl n ·,nlt in ".1udicial interference with state perogative concerning; 
t_hc ur!-:_anization of local governments .,. r,-------------
z 
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that it violated the Fifth Amendment and § 601 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 by knowingly funding CHA's 
racially discnmmatory family public housing program, 
nor does it quest10n the appropriateness of a remedial 
order designed to alleviate the effects of past segregative 
practices by requiring that public housing be developed 
in areas that will afford respondents an opportunity to 
reside m desegregated neighborhoods. But HUD con-
tends that the Milliken decision bars a remedy affecting 
its conduct beyond the boundaries of Chicago for two 
reasons. First, it asserts that such a remedial order 
would constitute the grant of relief incommensurate with 
the constitutional violation to be repaired. And, second, 
it claims that a decree regulating HUD's conduct be-
yond Chicago's boundaries would inevitably have the 
effect of "consolidat[ing] for remedial purposes" gov-
ernmental units not implicated in HUD's and CHA's vio-
lations. We address each of these arguments in turn. 
@ 
A 
We reject the contention that, since HUD 's con-
stitutional and statutory violations ,vere committed in 
Chicago. Milliken precludes an order against HUD that 
will affect its conduct in the greater Metropolitan area. 
The Ak · i distinction between HUD and the subur-
ban schbols districts in Milliken is that HUD has been 
found to have violated the Constitution. That violation 
provided the necessary predicate for the entry of a reme-
dial order against HUD and, indeed, imposed a duty on 
the District Court to grant appropriate relief. See 418 
U. S., at 744. Our prior decisions counsel that in the 
event of a constitutional violation "all reasonable 
methods be available to formulate an effective remedy," 
North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 
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a Jederal court LU em ploy those methods "to achieve the 
greatest possible degree of [relief]. taking into account-
the practicalities of the situation." Davis v. Board of 
School Comm 'rs. 402 l; . S. 33. 37. As the Court ob-
served in Swan n \ . C harlotte~M ecklenburg Board of 
Education "Once a nght and a v10lation have been 
sho\n1, the scope of a district court's equitable powers 
to remedy past ,nonirs 1s broad . for breath and flexi-
bility are inherem 111 equitable remedies." 402 U. S., 
at l f, 
l\'othing in the Milliken dec1s10n suggests a per se rule 
that federal courts lack authority to order parties found 
to have violated the Constitution to' undertake remedial 
efforts beyond the municipal boundaries of the city 
where the violation occurred .u As we noted in Part II , 
supra, the District Court's proposed remedy in Milliken 
\Vas impermissible because of the limits on the federal 
judicial power to interfere with the operation of state 
political entities that were not implicated 111 w1constitu-
t10nal conduct. Here. unlike the desegregation remedy 
found erroneous 111 Mil.liken, a judicial order directing 
relief beyond the boundary lines of Chicago ,,vill not 
13 Although the State of l\lichigan had been found to have com-
mitted const1tutiona.l v10lat1ons contnbutmg to racial segregat10n m 
the Det roit schools, 418 lT . S., at 734-735, n . 16, the Court in 
lt1uliken concluded that, the int.erdistrict order was a wrongful exer-
cise of judicial power because prior cases had established that such 
violations are to be dealt with in terms of "an established geo-
graphic and administrative school system" and because the State's , 
educational structure vested substantial independent control over "ji/ 
school affairs in the local school districts. See 418 U. S., at 742-- .II/ 
744. In Milliken, a consolidation order directed against the State ,-
would of necessity haYe abrogated the rights and powers of the , •• ~ 
suburban school dist ri cts under illic!ligan law. See id., at 742 ~ 
n . 20. Here, by cont.rast, a metropolitan area remedy involving- / / 
HLD need~i mra- ~n--sn'hs tbs 1 s01n; of abs b - .... .. ..... ~ ... fl: 
·P?riJ2! 3' pp)$ ', . 
~U"- .._,,__ 1'11~1i, G,J_ f•<,/•'~ OCC. MJ•~ - \ 
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necessanly entail coerc10u oi uninvolved governmental 
umts. because both CHA and HUD have the authority 
to operate outside the Chicago city limits.' ' 
Iii tlus case. It 11:i entirely appropnate and consistent 
with .1[illike11 to order CHA and HUD to attempt to 
create housing alternatives for the respondents m the 
Chicago suburbs. Here the "Tong committed by HUD 
confined the respondents to segregated public housing. 
The relevant geographic area for purposes of the re-
spondents' housing options is the Chicago housmg mar-
ket, not the Chicago city linuts. That ffCD recognizes 
this reality is evident in its administration of federal 
housing assistance programs through "housing market 
areas" encompassing "the geographic area 'within which 
all dwelling units . : are in competition with one an-
other as alternatives for the users of housing.'' Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, FHA Tech-
mques of Housing Market Analysis, January 1970, at 8, 
quoting The Institute for Urban Land Use and Housing 
Studies, Housing Market Analysis: A Study of Theory 
and Methods, 1953, at Ch. II The housing market area 
"usually extends beyond the city limits" and in the larger 
:14 Illinois statutes pernut a cit~ housrng authority to exercise-
its powers Wlthm an ''area of operation" defined to include the 
terntonaJ boundary of the cit~· and all of the area with.in three 
rrules beyond the city boundary that. is not loca.ted with.in the 
boundaries of another city, town, or village. In addition, the 
housmg authonty may act outside 1t~ area of operation by con-
tract with another housing authonty or with a state public body 
not within the area of operat10n of another housing authority. 
Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 67½, §§ 17 (b), 27c (1971) . 
Although the state officials m Milliken had the authority to 
operate across school dJStnct lines, the exercise of that authority 
to effectuaie the Court's de.segregation order would have elimmated 
numerous mdrpendent school d1stnc1s or at least have displaced 
important powPr~ ~ tho~e nnrnvolved governmental entitie:/'~~S~ee;,;;..,  ....,,.,.--'7,---... 
Il , 13, -~Upr(l_ 
-
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markets "may extend mto several ad.10111wg counties. " 
Jd., at p. 12.1 b An order against HUD and CHA regu-
lating their conduct m the greater metropolitan area will 
do no more than take mto account HUD's expert deter-
minat10n of the area rele,·ant to the respondents' housing 
opportunities and will thus be wholly commensurate ,vith 
the "nature and extent of the constitutional violation." 
418 U. S .. at 744. To foreclose such relief solely because 
HUD's constitutional violation took place ";ithin the 
city limits of Chicago would transform .1lilliken's prin-
cipled limitation on the exercise of federal judicial 
authority into an arbitrary and mechanical shield for 
those found to have engaged in unconstitutional conduct. 
B 
The more substantial question under :Milliken is 
whether an order agamst HUD affecting its conduct 
beyond Chicago's boundaries would impermissibly inter-
fere with local governments and suburban housing au-
thorities that have not been implicated in HUD's 
unconstitutional conduct. In examining this issue, it 
is important to note that the Court of Appeals ' decision 
did not endorse or even discuss "any specific metropolitan 
plan" but mstead left the formulation of the remedial 
plan to the District Court on remand. 503 F. 2d, at 936. 
On rehearing, the Court of Appeals characterized its 
remand order as one calling "for additional evidence and 
for furth€r consideration of the issue of metropolitan 
area relief in light of this opinion and that of the 
15 In principaJ markets such as Chicago, the Standard Metro-
politan Statistical Arca is coterminous mth the housing market 
area. See Depa rtment of Housmg and -Crban De,·elopment, FHA 
Techniques of Housing ::\Iarket Analysis, J anuary 1970, at 13; 
Department of Housmg and Urban DeYe]opment, Urban Housing 
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Supreme Court rn Milliken v. Bradley.'' Id. , at 940. 
In the current posture of the case. H UD 's contention 
that any remand for consideration of a metropolitan area 
order ,rnuld be impermissible as a matter of law must 
necessarily be based on its claim at oral argument "that 
court-ordered metropolitan relief in this case, no matter 
how gently it's gone about. no matter ho,Y it's framed , 
is bound to require HUD to ignore the safeguards of 
local autonomy and local political processes" and there-
fore to violate the limitations on federal judicial power 
established in 1vfilliken. In addressing this contention 
we are not called upon, in other words, to evaluate the 
validity of any specific order, since no such order has yet 
been formulated . 
HUD's position, we think , grossly underestimates the 
ability of a federal court to formulate a decree that will 
grant the respondents the constitutional relief to which 
they may be entitled without overstepping the limits of 
judicial power established in the Milliken case. HUD's 
discretion regarding the selection of housing proposals 
to assist with funding as ,Yell as its authority under a. 
recent statute to contract for low-income housing di-
ctly with private owners and developers can clearly 
be ·rected towards providing the respondents constitu-
tiona elief in the greater Chicago metropolitan area 
without ii8C. sfr~ 1ur~i11l1wt:.01 h5 HP iHinc h ool §8'\& 
"9'M u k w undercutting the role of those governments 
m the federal housing assistance scheme. 
An order directing HUD to use its discretion under the 
various federal housing programs to foster projects lo-
cated in white areas of the Chicago housing market would 
be consistent with and supportive of well-established 
federal housing policy.16 Ti tle VI of the Civil Rights 
rn In the D1st nct Court, HUD filed an appendn: detailing the 
various federal programs designed to secure better housing oppor~ 
... _____.....____.._ ___________ ...___ _ 
!Vt>, 
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Act oi 1964 prohibits racial discrimination in federally 
assisted programs including, of course , public housing 
programs." Based upon this statutory prohibition, 
H UD in 1967 issued site approval rules for low-rent 
housing designed to avoid racial segregation and expand 
the opportunities of minority group members " to locate 
outside areas of [minority] concentration. " Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development. Low-Rent 
Housing l\Ianual, § 205.1 11 4 (g) (February 1967 re-
vision ) . Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 
expressly directed the Secretary of HUD to "administer 
the programs and activities relating to housing and urban 
development in a manner affirmatively to further" the 
Act's fair housing policy. 42 U. S. C. § 3608 (d) (5) 
(1970). 
Among the steps taken by HUD to discharge its statu-
tory duty to promote fair housing was the adoption of 
project selection criteria for use in "eliminating clearly 
unacceptable proposals and assigning priorities in fund-
ing to assure that the best proposals are funded first. " 
Evaluation of Rent Supplement Projects and Low-rent 
Housing Assistance Applications. 37 Fed. Reg. 203 
( 1972). In structuring the minority housing opportu-
nity component of the project selection criteria. HUD at-
tempted "to assure that building in minority areas goes 
forward only after there truly exists housing opportuni-
ties for minorities elsewhere" in the housing market and 
to avoid encouraging projects located in racially mixed 
areas. Id. , at 204. See 24 CFR § 200.710 (1975). See 
tunities for low-income famjlies and represented that "the Depart-
ment will continue to use its best efforts in review and approval of 
housing programs for Chicago ,,·luch address the needs of low 
income families." 
li It. was this statutory prohibition that HUD was held to have 
violated by its funding of CHA 's housing projects . See 448 F. 2d 
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generally Max,vell. HUD's Project Selection Criteria, 
48 Notre Dame L. Rev. 92 (1972) .18 More recently. in 
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 
Congress emphasized the importance of locating housing 
so as to promote greater choice of housing opportunities 
and to avoid undue concentrations of lo,ver income per-
sons. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 5301 (c)(6), 5304 (a)(4)(A), 
(c) (ii) (Supp. 1975); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1114, at 8. 
A remedial plan designed to insure that HUD will 
utilize its funding and administrative powers in a man-
ner consistent with affording relief to the respondents 
need not abrogate the role of local governmental units 
in the federal housing assistance programs. Under the 
major housing programs in existence at the time the 
District Court entered its remedial order pertaining to 
HUD, local housing authorities and municipal govern-
ments had to make application for funds or approve the 
use of funds in the locality before HUD could make 
housing assistance money available. See 42 U. S. C. 
§§1415(7)(b), 142lb (a)(2) (1970). An order di-
rected solely to HUD would not force unwilling localities 
to app1y for assistance under these programs but would 
merely reinforce the regulations guiding HUD's deter-
mination of which of the locally authorized projects to 
assist with federal funds . 
·The Housing and Community development Act of 
18 A HUD study of the implementation of the project selection 
criteria revealed that the actual operation of the minority housing 
opportunity criterion depends on the definition of "area of minority 
concentration" and "racially mixed area" employed by each field 
office. The meaning of those terms, which are not defined in the 
applicable regulations, 24 CFR § 200.710, varied among field offices 
. and within the jurisdiction of particular field offices. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, Implementation of HUD 
Project Selection Criteria for Subsidized Housing: An EvaluationL 
December 1972, at 116-117, 
-
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1974, 42 U.S. C. ~ 1437 et seq. (Supp. 1975), significantly 
enlarged ffGD's role in the creation of housing oppor-
tunities. Under the ~ 8 Lower-Income Housing Assist-
ance program, which has largely replaced the older fed-
eral low-income housing programs.19 HUD may contract 
directly with private owners to make leased housing units 
available to eligible lower-income persons. 20 As HUD 
has acknowledged in this case , "local governmental ap-
proval is no longer explicitly required as a condition of 
the j)rogram's applicability to a locality.' ' Regulations 
governing the § 8 program permit HUD to select "the 
geographic area or areas in which the housing is to be 
constructed," 24 CFR § 880.203 (b). and direct that sites 
be chosen to "promote greater choice of housing oppor-
tunities and avoid undue concentration of assisted per-
sons in areas containing a high proportion of low-income 
persons." 24 CFR §§ 880.112 (d), 883.209 (a) (3) 
(1975). See id.,§§ 880.112 (b) , (c), 883.209 (a)(2), (b) 
(2). In most cases the Act grants the unit of local gov-
ernment in which the assistance is to be provided the 
19 For fiscal year 1975 estimated contract payments under the 
§ 8 program were approxunately $10,700,000 as compared to a. 
total estimated payment of $16,350.000 for all federal subsidized 
housing programs. The comparable figures for fi scal year 1976 
indicate that $22,725,000 of a total $24,800,000 in estimated con-
tractual pa.yments are to be made under the § 8 program. See 
Hearings on Department of Housing and Urban Development-
Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1976, before the Subco=. 
on HUD-Independent Agencies of the House Comm. on Appro-
priations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 85-86 (1975). See also 
id .. at 119 (testiomny of HUD Secretary Hills) . 
20 Under the § 8 program , HUD contracts to make payments .to 
local public housing agencies or to private owners of housing units 
to make up the difference between a fai r market rent for the area 
and the amount. contributed by the low-income tenant. The eligible 
tenant family pays between 15% and 25% of its gross income for 
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right to comment on the application and, in certain 
specified circumstances, to preclude the Secretary of 
HUD from approving the application. See 42 U . S. C. 
§§ 1439 (a) - (c) (Supp. 1975) .21 1:se of the § 8 program 
to expand low-income housing opportunities outside areas 
of minority concentration ·would not have a coercive ef-
fect on suburban municipalities. For under the program, 
the local governmental units retain the right to comment 
21 If the local unit of goYernment in which the proposed assistance 
is to be provided does not have an approved housing assistance 
plan, the Secretary of HUD is directed by statute to give the local 
governmental entity 30 days to comment on the proposal after 
which time the Secretary may approve the project unless he deter-
mines that there is not a need for the assistance. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1439 (c) (Supp. 1975) . In areas covered by an approved plan, 
the local governmental entity is afforded a 30-day period in which 
to object to the project on the ground that it is inconsistent. with 
the municipality's approved housing assistance plan. If such an 
objection is filed, the Secretary may nonetheless approve the appli-
cation if he determines that the proposal is consistent with the 
housing assistance plan. 42 U. S. C. § 1439 (a). The local com-
ment and objection procedures do not apply to applications for 
assistance involving 12 or fewer units m a single project or develop-
ment. 42 U.S. C. § 1439 (b) . 
The ability of local governments to block proposed § 8 projects 
thus depends on the size of the proposed project and the provisions 
of the approved housing assistance pla.ns. Under the 1974 Act, the 
housing assistance plan must assess the needs of lower-income per-
sons residing in or expected to reside in the community and must 
indicate the general locations of proposed housing for lower-income 
persons selected in accordance with the statutory objective of 
"promoting greater choice of housing opportunities and avoiding 
undue concentration of assisted persons." 42 U. S. C. §§ 5304 
(a) ( 4) (A), (C) (ii). See also City of Hartford v. Hills, -
F . Supp. - , Civil No. H-75-258 (Conn. , Jan. 28, 1976). In 
view of these requirements of the Act, the location of subsidized' 
housing in predominately white areas of suburban municipalities· 
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on specific assistance proposals, to reject proposals that 
are inconsistent with their housing assistance plans. and 
to require that zoning and other land use restrictions be 
adhered to by builders. , 
In sum, there is no basis for the petitioner 's claim that 
court-ordered metropolitan relief in this case would be 
impermissible as a matter of law under the Milliken 
decision. In contrast to the desegregation order in that 
case, a metropolitan relief order directed to HUD would 
not consolidate or in any way restructure local govern-
mental units. The remedial decree would neither force 
suburban governments to submit public housing pro-
posals to HUD nor displace the ·rights and powers 
accorded local government entities under federal or state 
housing statutes or existing land use laws. The order 
would have the same effect on the suburban governments 
as a discretionary decision by HUD to use its statutory 
powers to provide the respondents with alternatives to 
the racially segregated Chicago public housing system 
created by CHA and HUD. 
Since we conclude that a metropolitan area remedy in 
this case is not impermissible as a matter of law, we 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding 
the case to the District Court "for additional evidence 
and for further consideration of metropolitan relief." 
503 F. 2d, at 940. Our determination that the District 
Court has the authority to direct HUD to engage in 
remedial efforts in the :metropolitan area outside the city 
limits of Chicago should not be interpreted as requiring 
a metropolitan area order. The nature and scope of the 
remedial decree to be entered on remand is a matter for 
the District Court in the exercise of its equitable discre-
tion , after affording the parties an opportunity to present· 
their views. 
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case to the District Court is affirmed, but further pro-
ceedings in the District Court are to be consistent with 
this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
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